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This article aims to evaluate the contribution of Bentham’s ideas to the jurisprudential debate in view 
of their relevance vis a vis their contemporary reception. The focus is on Bentham’s revolutionary 
idea of publicity with its spill-over effects on contemporary debates on the rule of law and accountable 
and transparent governance. As far as the method is concerned, after having examined Bentham’s 
ideas on the rule of law and the debate they raised, the focus in second section of this article is 
specifically on his conception of publicity. Some critical remarks then show that Bentham’s focus on 
publicity and transparency has been rightly interpreted in the contemporary debate as an important 
contribution. However, it is their justification that it is judged to be problematic. In fact, the 
assessment of the fundamental importance of publicity for the rule of law and transparent and 
accountable governance leads to a critical engagement with contemporary readings of Bentham’s 
scholarship, in primis that of Gerald Postema, with a development of the latter’s republican 
interpretation. The direction of travel that is proposed is towards a more liberal republicanism. The 
article not only shows how Bentham’s contribution should be revaluated in view of contemporary 
interpretations, but also proposes directions for further research developments according to which 
contemporary conceptions of regulation need to take a reflexive turn while aiming at legitimate 
legality at the same time. 
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RESUMO 
Este artigo tem como objetivo avaliar a contribuição das ideias de Bentham para o debate 
jurisprudencial em vista de sua relevância e recepção contemporânea. O foco está na ideia 
revolucionária de publicidade de Bentham, com seus efeitos colaterais nos debates contemporâneos 
sobre o Estado de direito e a governança responsável e transparente. Quanto ao método, após ter 
examinado as ideias de Bentham sobre o Estado de direito e o debate que elas suscitaram, o foco na 
segunda seção deste artigo é especificamente em sua concepção de publicidade. Algumas observações 
críticas mostram que a atenção de Bentham em publicidade e transparência foi corretamente 
interpretada no debate contemporâneo como uma contribuição importante. No entanto, é a 
justificativa delas que é considerada problemática. Verificou-se que uma avaliação da importância 
fundamental da publicidade para o Estado de direito e governança transparente e responsável leva a 
um envolvimento crítico com leituras contemporâneas das obras de Bentham, principalmente a de 
Gerald Postema, com um desenvolvimento da interpretação republicana deste último. O percurso 
proposto é em direção a um republicanismo mais liberal. No presente estudo, não somente demostra-
se como a contribuição de Bentham deveria ser reavaliada em vista das interpretações 
contemporâneas, mas também são propostas direções para novos desenvolvimentos de pesquisa, de 
acordo com as quais as concepções contemporâneas de regulação precisam tomar uma virada 
reflexiva, ao mesmo tempo que devem visar a legalidade legítima. 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE 




Bentham’s contributions to philosophical and theoretical legal thinking are extensive and 
scattered: for example, his ideas have been crucial for having founded analytical jurisprudence 
(TINCANI, 2007, p. 201). As noted by Postema (2019a, p. 462) in his afterword of the new edition 
of Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, it is important to stress that “Bentham was not just a 
utilitarian and a positivist; he was a utilitarian positivist”. This means that 
 
[…] despite what might be contrarily thought (and has been extensively held), Bentham’s 
upholding of the principle of utility (“the fundamental principle guiding all rational 
deliberation, the ultimate rational decision principle” […]) is not incompatible with his 
(normative and anti-authoritarian, i.e. “anti-Hobbesian” and “anti-Austinian” […]) positivist 
views (SILIQUINI-CINELLI, 2020, p. 318). 
 
 
1  The authors are grateful to the anonymous referees as well as to Tony Ward, Gustavo Dalpupo de Lara and Márcio 
Eduardo Zuba for comments, and Gerald Postema, Thomas Bustamante and Thiago Lopes Decat for prompting our 
interest in writing this paper. Although this paper is the result of intense dialogue and of many years of collaboration, 
the first two sections were written mainly by Natalina Stamile, while the last two were written mainly by Gianluca 
Andresani. 
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Beyond that, from the beginning, one of the most discussed points of Bentham’s theory was 
in relation to English common law and its defectiveness and inadequacy to make its institutions work 
in a non-arbitrary way2. According to Postema (2019a, p. vii), Bentham “mercilessly and effectively 
attacked” the common law system, emphasizing that 
 
“As a System of general rules, Common Law is a thing merely imaginary” (Com. 119). 
Common-law theory is incoherent; whatever it is a theory of, it cannot be a theory of some 
kind of law. Common-law theory is committed to what we might call the “corrigibility thesis” 
according to which, although judges are empowered to settle particular cases, any 
formulations of rules justifying their decisions, even those of the deciding judges themselves, 
are corrigible, open to challenge and reformulation. (Recall that Blackstone wrote that the 
law and the opinion of the judge are different things, because it is possible for the judge to 
mistake the law.) Common law exists not in the case or judicial opinion, but rather in shared 
practice. This thesis, Bentham charged, is incoherent (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 167, emphasis 
in the original). 
 
The reason is that it is impossible for anyone to know beforehand what the law establishes 
because it is something in progress and it is created during its own process and adjudication, which 
is contrary to the key function of law, i.e. to maintain stable expectations3. In other words: nobody is 
capable of establishing when a conduct or a behavior is lawful until a decision has been made by a 
judge. Hence, the English common law is like a “dog’s law”: only after the dog has acted, one could 
know if its action is permitted or prohibited. In this way, a legal system so structured is clearly useless 
for all including the judges4. 
As Postema (2019b, p. 169 et seq.) puts clearly in evidence, in Bentham’s quasi-positivist 
framework, in which utilitarian and legal positivist perspectives are merged, the common law does 
not allow the judges “to reason publicly” in such a way to ensure security. 
 
Bentham readily agreed with Coke that the “reason” of the common-law bench and bar was 
“artificial,” but, to his mind, this in no way recommended it; on the contrary, it guaranteed 
that Common Law was “technical”, “absurd”, and ultimately “dishonest” (B iv. 498). 
Contrary to its orthodox doctrine, common law […] was quite literally nothing, if not judge-
made5. Who made the so-called unwritten law? “If not judges, then who … [for] laws don’t 
make themselves” (LW 124–6; see Com. 223). Such a system of judge-made law is 
unavoidably retroactive (“dog law”), he charged, and undermines responsible allegiance to 
the law (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 165, emphasis in the original). 
 
 
2  See for example: FERRARO, 2009. As noted by the author, Jeremy Bentham is universally known as an opponent of 
common law, considered “sham law”, “judge-made law” or “ex-post-facto law” (esp. p. 453, but see ZHAI, 2017). 
3  For the critiques to the Bentham’s theory of adjudication cf. FERRARO, 2010, 2013. On the function of law being 
the maintenance of stable expectations see LUHMANN, 2008, 2016. 
4  “‘When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the 
way you make laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges make law for you and me. They won’t tell a man 
beforehand what it is he should not do… they lie by till he has done something which they say he should not have 
done, and then they hang him for it.’ (B v. 235)” (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 165, emphasis in the original). 
5  See BENTHAM, 1962, III, p. 223-224; IV, p. 483-485; V, p. 546; VII, p. 539. 
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 I.e., such a system undermines the rule of law: “Judge-made law secures obedience and 
social order only by playing on the blind fear of citizens, not by addressing clear directives to them 
and articulating the reasons for these directives (B i. 161; UC 69.151, 163)” (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 
165). 
The judges decide according to – and apply – the judicial precedent, that is they reproduce 
the reasoning of previous judges and so “close own individual reason in the drawer” and a “certain 
“hardness of heart” becomes “predominant in the system” (BENTHAM, 1970, p. 194-195)6, due 
 
[…] to the fact that a strict doctrine of binding precedent, for all its merits in underwriting 
citizen security and the predictability of the law, requires that judges and lawyers turn a blind 
eye to special circumstances and the harms done to particular parties by precedent-based rules 
(even when they are reasonable), in order not to lose the benefits of general perception in the 
community of adherence to predictable rules (Com. 195) (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 166). 
 
But as noted by Postema (2019b, p. 155): 
 
Furthermore, Blackstone and other common law jurists allow that some precedents can be 
set aside when the precedent in question is “against reason”, or there is very good reason for 
setting it aside (Bs Com I.71).7 This relative flexibility is due in part to the fact that, according 
to common law theory, established law rests on, and derives its authority from, a shared sense 
of the historical appropriateness and general reasonableness of the rules8. An eighteenth 
century judge, for example, wrote: “private justice, moral fitness, and public convenience, 
when applied to a new subject, make common law without precedent, much more when 
received and approved by usage.”9 
 
The purpose of this article is to examine if and to what extent Jeremy Bentham should be 
considered our contemporary. Analytical jurisprudence originated from the debate that his ideas 
raised and still attract the attention of contemporary legal theorists. In this respect, he is one of the 
most contemporary of all modern legal theorists. Moreover, his critical straws thrown against the 
 
6  Not included in BENTHAM, 1945. 
7  “See generally Rupert Cross, Precedent in English Law, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 5, 8–11, 25, 28. 
This sentiment is echoed in the mid-nineteenth century by Lord St. Leonards: ‘You are not bound by any rule of law 
which you may lay down if upon a subsequent occasion you should find a reason to differ from that rule; that is, that 
this House, like every court of justice, possesses an inherent power to correct an error into which it may have fallen.’ 
Bright v. Hutton (1852), 3 H.L.C. 343 at 388 (quoted by Cross, Precedent, 23)” (emphasis in the original). 
8  For more details on the concept of reasonableness in Law see STAMILE (forthcoming) in which the author analyzes 
different and possible definitions and uses of reasonableness in Law. See also STAMILE, 2015, esp. p. 222 in which 
the author highlights that “even if the concept of reasonableness has vague and ill-defined contours, it seems to have 
‘two souls’, one deriving from case law while the other is of a more theoretical-philosophical nature”. Thus, particular 
attention is given to determining not only the nature and origins of reasonableness but also and especially to explaining 
the duality inherent in this concept. 
9  “J. Willis, in Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303 at 2312 (quoted in Cross, Precedent, 26). See also the following 
passage from Blackstone: ‘The authority of these maxims rests entirely upon general reception and usage; and the 
only method of proving that this or that maxim is a rule of common law, is by showing that it hath been always the 
custom to observe it. [I]n our law the goodness of a custom depends upon its having been used time out of mind, or, 
in the solemnity of our legal phrase, time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. This it is that gives 
it its weight and authority’ (Bs Com I, 68, 67)” (emphasis in the original). 
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common law tradition were conducive to subsequent attempts to build conceptions of the rule of law 
fit for the needs of the modern era. However, it will be argued that squaring the circle of enhancing 
the efficacy of transparency and accountability mechanisms through publicity while maintaining at 
the same time a robust conception of the rule of law will show the part of his thought which has to 
be reckoned as of a lesser contemporaneous relevance. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After having summarized in this first section the 
most relevant ideas of Bentham in relation to the rule of law, in the second section the issues related 
to publicity and transparent accountability are addressed in order to prepare the terrain for the 
discussion in the third section on the trade off with fundamental liberties, where the focus switches 
on the critical tensions in Bentham’s ideas. The discussion is wrapped up in the concluding remarks 
with recommendations for further research. 
 
1 BENTHAM ON THE PUBLIC CHARACTER OF LAW 
 
In contemporary jurisprudence, following Hart’ work, Postema’s10 early reading of Bentham 
raised quite an interest in the institutional branch of the positivist tradition challenged by Joseph Raz 
(1979 [2009]). Postema’s (2019a; 2019b) revisionist reading highlights the importance of Bentham’s 
reflections on the foundations of law and adjudication for 
 
[…] a jurisprudential debate of historic dimensions and fundamental philosophical 
significance. Bentham writings, and the tradition of debate which they originated, raise 
questions concerning not only the nature and tasks of law, but also the role of normative 
moral-political theory in the construction and defense of conceptions of the nature of law 
(POSTEMA, 2019a, p. vii)11. 
 
Law is a complex phenomenon that requires scientific rigor in the method of studying it. For 
this reason, Postema emphasizes that Bentham proposed the elaboration of the method called 
analytical jurisprudence with the aim of studying law scientifically, by distinguishing between sein 
and sollen. Bentham draws upon Hume, but he does not share his doubts about the belief in objective 
values. In fact, according to Bentham, utility has a value that is not only objective (ethical 
objectivism) and knowable (ethical cognitivism) but also quantifiable: utility could be calculated, so 
transforming morality into a science (BARBERIS, 2004, p. 98). In this way, utilitarianism could be 
considered as a form of “legal rationalism” that leads to positivism when it admits the thesis of the 
separability between law and morality (BARBERIS, 2004, p. 98), as summarized in the mentioned 
 
10  See HART, 1982a; POSTEMA, 1989a. 
11  See also POSTEMA, 1989a, 2020b. 
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distinction between sein and sollen12. However, Postema’s revisionist reading challenges such a 
distinction. What the law establishes is not neatly severed from issues of justice: the evaluation of 
justice is subsumed under the “master value”, i.e. utility13. Traditional and current positivist 
approaches have neglected this aspect according to Postema. In fact, having neglected this aspect and 
under the influence of Hume and his distinction between the cognitive sphere and the normative 
sphere, the separation thesis was formulated by Hart, as it is known today14. 
The analytical jurisprudence of Bentham introduced many distinctions inside legal theory. 
In this vein two types of jurisprudence emerged, and they are useful to uncover the origins of the 
analytical philosophy of positive law (TINCANI, 2017, p. 205-206): the first called expository 
jurisprudence, which focuses on the descriptive dimension of law, that is on how the law is. Inside 
expository jurisprudence, it is also possible to distinguish authoritative jurisprudence (expository 
jurisprudence produces legal direct effect) from no-authoritative jurisprudence (it does not produce 
legal effect or not directly)15. Furthermore, inside the non authoritative expository jurisprudence, it is 
possible to distinguish local jurisprudence (the description of national specific legal systems) from 
universal jurisprudence (in the sense of legal concepts that are common to every legal system as 
characteristic of the law itself) (CHIASSONI, 2016, p. 9). The second, called censorial jurisprudence, 
emphasizes the normative aspect of law, i.e. how it should be (BENTHAM, 1776). This distinction 
was the terrain of culture for methodological positivism that would be elaborated a couple of centuries 
after Bentham’s writings. Norberto Bobbio, for instance, refers to methodological positivism (the 
study of law as based on the Wetfreiheit principle, i.e. on a non-evaluative method), as distinct from 
theoretical positivism (as a set of positivist theses and theories) and ideological positivism (as based 
on the normative thesis that law must be obeyed)16. By the same token, a similar approach can be 
found in Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin (1971) when they assert that the legal validity of a 
norm does not imply necessarily its moral validity and so moral validity does not imply necessarily 
 
12  It is important to stress that utilitarianism will become the dominant normative ethics in the Anglo-Saxon world in the 
twentieth century and it will meet in John Rawls one of its most formidable adversaries. 
13  See POSTEMA, 2019, especially the second part. 
14  For the analysis of the contributions and tensions in legal positivism, see NAVARRO, 2001, p. 133-163, 2005. See 
also POSTEMA, 2011. 
15  Tincani connects the distinction between authoritative jurisprudence and not authoritative jurisprudence to the 
distinction between jurisprudence and doctrine; but he highlights that this is not the real intention of Bentham, who 
had in mind the difference between the discourse of the legislator and the discourse of the jurist. See also CHIASSONI, 
2016. 
16  See BOBBIO, 1961, 1972, esp. p. 101-126. For more details about the importance of this distinction in the analytical 
legal philosophical debate see also SCARPELLI, 1965. 
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its legal validity17. So, if Bobbio’s distinction is adopted, the legal positivism expressed by Bentham 
seems to be characterized by ideological positivism because he is interested especially in the 
maximization of collective utility, and in his criticism of the common law the scientific observation 
is instrumental to its substitution with another system of law, inspired by the utilitarian principle. 
Furthermore, the Hobbesian doctrine has been almost universally adopted by legal positivism. It is 
particularly direct in John Austin, founder of “Analytical Jurisprudence”, the utilitarian and empiricist 
Anglo-Saxon version of legal positivism, established on the European continent, and also by 
Bentham. The latter, despite being influenced by the enlightenment and his political radicalism, 
develops a “vaguely” realistic and legal positive conception of law. In fact, according to Bentham, 
law is 
 
an assemblage of signs declarative of a volition conceived or adopted by the sovereign in a 
state, concerning the conduct to be observed in a certain case by a certain person or class of 
persons, who in the case in question are or are supposed to be subject to his power 
(BENTHAM, 1945, p. 88). 
 
In contrast to H.L.A. Hart and Karl Olivecrona, who claim that Bentham’s legal positivism 
would consist in the scientific and non-evaluative observation of law as it is (such that it is distinct 
from how the law should be)18, Postema (2019b, p. 73) highlights that 
 
Bentham suggested it is possible to construct a powerful ethical deliberating machine capable 
of churning out precise, determinate, and publicly verifiable judgments and prescriptions for 
all moral occasions, both private and public. On this view, once we make a precise and 
determinate assessment of the quantities of pleasure and pain of each of the persons affected 
by some range of actions or policies open to us, we can calculate their relative hedonic sums 
for each individual and from them for the community as a whole. The principle of utility 
requires that we choose the action or policy that comes out on top. 
 
Postema notes that his reading of Bentham acknowledges his concept of law as imperative 
and its connection with a sanction. However, the revisions that Postema indicates emphasize the 
“constitutive” power of “establishing and overseeing government institutions” (POSTEMA, 2019b, 
p. 136), i.e. the discursive and argumentative dimensions of the law. Law’s ruling is based on mutual 
accountability, with a focus on its interpersonal rather than impersonal dimension, making in this way 
the connection with the sanction much less stringent, since it relies on being transparent: i.e. publicly 
accountable and subject to moral sanction (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 199, 2019a, p. 246). Bentham’s 
negative judgment about the common law is in fact based on the risk of leading to arbitrary i.e. 
 
17  See also POSTEMA, 2019a, p. 226. This claim is made also by Hans Kelsen, Alf Ross, and H.L.A. Hart, as well as 
N. Bobbio. 
18  See FERRARO, 2009, esp. p. 453. For more details see also CRUZ, 2000; HART, 1982b; OLIVECRONA, 1975, p. 
95-110. 
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unaccountable decisions. This convinced Bentham of the necessity to elaborate the concept of a 
system. 
 
Bentham’s radical critique of common law theory and practice revealed a theme that runs 
deep through all his jurisprudential writings: law is an enterprise of public rules, procedures, 
and institutions the primary task of which is to define and structure social relationships and 
thereby coordinate social interaction. The ultimate end, of course, is to promote the welfare 
of the community as defined by the principle of utility. Bentham came to see that the most 
fundamental problem that utilitarian universal jurisprudence had to address was the problem 
posed by the ever-present tension between the need for stability and certainty of the law, on 
the one hand, and its ability to respond flexibly and reasonably to constantly changing 
particular circumstances, on the other (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 171). 
 
As Postema highlights, this critique has been recently reformulated and retaken by Peter 
Birks (1996, p. 5), who also regrets “the absence of system” in contemporary common law19. Together 
with his emphasis on its ethos, the systemic dimension is at the heart of his conception of the rule of 
law. Nevertheless, contrary to Bentham’s views20, Birks does not want to destroy the common law to 
construct a code or to realize a codification, but he is convinced that: 
 
The doctrine of precedent has lost much of its rigour. The one hope now is to tighten up its 
reasoning, founding stability on a sophisticated rationality. There is as yet no crisis, only a 
cloud on the horizon. The shape and nature of the cloud can just be detected. If the common 
law cannot install new mechanisms against intellectual disorder, it will come under 
increasing criticism and, if it then manages to escape a radical politicisation, it will not be 
able to resist the next wave of enthusiasm for codification. More attention must be urgently 
paid to the rational strength of the law. The search for principle must be conducted more 
vigorously. That means more logic and less experience, more system and less empiricism. 
Improved taxonomy is essential. Dependence on the alphabet has encouraged disorderly and 
conflicting categories. The common law has failed to organise the categories of its thought. 
That is what is meant by the absence of system (BIRKS, 1996, p. 5). 
 
In addition, Postema (2020a) argues that this approach still doesn’t take sufficiently into 
account the instances or the exigencies deriving from the rule of law’s ethos21. Furthermore, he 
 
19  For more details about the concept of system see ALCHOURRÓN; BULYGIN, 1971; LOSANO, 2002. 
20  Postema affirms that “[t]he tensions he highlighted in common-law jurisprudence were, in his own view, tensions 
deep in law. He was convinced that English common law exacerbated them and his codification proposal, and 
constrained adjudication under the codes, went a long way toward resolving them, but could not ultimately eliminate 
them”. For more details cf.: POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 174. See moreover POSTEMA, 1989a, p. 191, 260-62 where Hart’s 
claim that Bentham’s doctrine of popular sovereignty is a radical departure from his earlier views is criticized. Also, 
ZHAI, 2017, p. 529. 
21  In addition, if one takes in consideration modern legal positivism, validity marks the boundaries of the legal order 
through norms. In Postema’s revisionist (or quasi-)posivism (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 300), the central point is to 
establish when the norm is valid (POSTEMA, 2019b, esp. ch 9). The author affirms that “[i]t might appear that 
Bentham’s critique of common-law theory and practice begs the most important question between positivist and 
common-law conceptions, viz., whether law should be conceived of on the model of discrete, publicly articulated rules 
made or posited by an authorized or authority-bearing law-maker. However, I think Bentham’s commitment to this 
model is not presupposition, but consequence of a deeper assumption about law which he assumes he shares with 
common-law jurists” (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 169). For more details about validity, efficiency and the legal system see 
BULYGIN, 1995; MORESO; NAVARRO, 1993; NAVARRO, 1990, 2016, 2017. 
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affirms that law is necessarily a matter of common public standards and “[c]ommon-law fails, most 
fundamentally, not because it fails to fit the model of command, or because its maker cannot be 
manifestly identified, but rather that anything it puts forward as candidates for legal norms fails on 
this publicity test” (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 169). 
Amongst the contemporary readings, Postema’s revisionist interpretation of Bentham is the 
most refreshing. The importance of combining publicity and transparency (ANDRESANI; 
STAMILE, 2018) with the more formal, legality aspects (ANDRESANI; STAMILE, 2019, 
forthcoming) in upholding the rule of law have already been emphasized and in what follows by 
drawing on previous work some critical remarks to the discussion of Bentham’s ideas are proposed. 
 
2 CRITICAL TENSIONS 
 
The literature on Bentham occupies entire libraries and innumerable works have been written 
about his thought. He is considered one of the most influential philosophers of the 18th and 19th 
centuries. Jeremy Bentham is primarily known as the originator of the school of utilitarianism. 
However, it is important to stress that in this regard there are many and strong criticisms. John Stuart 
Mill, Bentham’s pupil, controversially describes the materialistic conception of Bentham as 
characterized and justified on the basis of a serious philosophical myopia. Furthermore, Mill pointed 
out early on the gap in Bentham’s conception of human need and desire: 
 
[m]an is never recognized by him as a being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an 
end of desiring, for its own sake, the conformity of his own character to his standard of 
excellence, without hope of good and fear of evil from other source than his own inward 
consciousness (MILL, 1968, p. 34)22. 
 
More incisive are the criticisms formulated by Karl Marx, who focuses on the lack of 
originality in Bentham’s thought. In Capital (MARX, 1887, p. 24-25), he states: 
 
Bentham is a purely English phenomenon. […]. The principle of utility was no discovery of 
Bentham. He simply reproduced in his dull way what Helvétius and other Frenchmen had 
said with esprit in the 18th century. To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog-
nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to 
man, he that would criticise all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of 
utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified 
in each historical epoch. Bentham makes short work of it. With the driest naiveté he takes 
the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the normal man. 
 
 
22  For more details about the analysis of Mill on Bentham see CHIASSONI, 2016; MCPHERSON, 1982; NUSSBAUM, 
2004; TINCANI, 2009. Nevertheless, it is useful to stress that Mill’s ideas are coherent and fits into the utilitarian 
tradition and for some versions it is possible to consider them as a kind of development of Bentham’s theses. In this 
regard see e.g. MILL (2006). 
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So, Bentham seems to appear “a genius in the way of bourgeois stupidity” (MARX, 1887, 
p. 25). 
Beyond these reflections, Bentham’s legacy is undisputed and remarkable. For example, 
John Rawls (1971 [1999]), one of the most important political philosophers, in laying the foundations 
of his procedural theory of justice analyzes and discusses Bentham’s utilitarianism. Perhaps this is 
enough to demonstrate how Benthamian utilitarianism has constituted and continues to constitute a 
key passage in the elaboration of philosophy and also an useful instrument for understanding 
contemporaneity23. 
Nevertheless, it would be quite difficult to overestimate the revolutionary importance of the 
publicity test (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 266). Bentham reckons in fact that transparent governance, at 
both the international and national level, would operate in such a way that “would be fully public, 
open to a freely operating press and relying ultimately on the power of public opinion, of nations and 
individuals, to secure compliance with its decisions” (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 298). He “designed an 
extraordinary array of formal and informal devices to secure transparency” (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 
299)24. 
Postema (2019b, p. 235) is right to point out that the discursive and public justification of 
rights must be embedded in actual polities rather than being the result of hypothetical agreements. 
This brings the discussion to the limits of Bentham’s account. First of all, it neglects issues of conflict, 
especially of principle (POSTEMA, 2019b, esp. ch. 9 and p. 10). In fact, “it gives too much weight 
to the role of consensus”25 (POSTEMA, 1989b, p. 55) instrumentally, i.e. conventionally, achieved. 
Postema is right in critiquing Bentham’s account of law for focusing “exclusively on the ability of 
laws to settle with finality problems of principled as well as interested conflict”26 (POSTEMA, 1989b, 
p. 59). A robust conception of the rule of law would have to be embedded in the discursive practices 
 
23  E.g., there are many interesting debates against utilitarianism but also critical of Rawls’s (Political) Liberalism as well 
as the Republican tradition. Susan Moller Okin (1989) argues that a foundational assumption is incorrect because of 
a faulty perception of gender or family relations. More broadly, according to Okin, the modern theories of justice 
(such as those of Rawls, Nozick, MacInture, Walzer, etc.) focus on a male perspective that wrongly assumes that the 
institution of the family is just. Okin highlights that the family perpetuates gender inequalities throughout all of society, 
particularly because children acquire their values and ideas in the family’s sexist setting, then grow up to enact these 
ideas as adults. If a theory of justice is to be complete, Okin asserts that it must include women and it must address 
the gender inequalities that are prevalent in modern-day families. Most recently, Nancy Fraser has criticized Rawls’s 
theory of justice. She argues that justice can be understood in two separate but interrelated ways: distributive justice 
(in terms of a more equitable distribution of resources), and the justice of recognition (the equal recognition of different 
identities/groups within a society). See FRASER, 1998, and also FRASER; HONNETH, 2003. 
24  See also “a demand for transparency which mobilized a public discipline for accountability-holding and a demand for 
reasons which mobilized public deliberation” (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 299, emphasis in the original). 
25  Even if consensus is conceptualized as just a regulative ideal, see Postema 2019b, p. 242, and especially ch. 9 and 10. 
26  See also Postema 2019b, ch. 9. 
 
  P á g i n a  | 183 
GIANLUCA ANDRESANI • NATALINA STAMILE 
REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO UFPR | CURITIBA, VOL. 65, N. 3, SET./DEZ. 2020 | P. 173 – 189 
as well as in the history of existing pluralistic and complex polities in order to realistically address 
the issue of deep disagreement about problems of principle which would not result in ‘only 
temporary’ solutions which are instrumental to the transparent aggregation of individual 
preferences/desires (POSTEMA, 2019b, ch. 9)27. At the heart of a deliberative democratic conception 
which aims at “protecting liberty, enlisting fairness” (POSTEMA, 1989b, p. 59) and relies on “the 
principle of equal political power” (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 246) security as stability of expectations 
requires robust formal mechanisms of legality which are the result instead of preferences/desires 
modifiable by reasoned public deliberation. Consensus on matters of fundamental rights that a polity 
ascribes to itself cannot be “temporary” (POSTEMA, 2019b, ch. 9). The French that Bentham mocked 
have indeed learned from their history so that when they decided on 4 October 1958 to change their 
constitution they went through a difficult and lengthy process of in-depth deliberation which has 
given security to the Fifth Republic ever since. Bentham’s problem is that he interprets the public 
character of law “as strict conventionality” (POSTEMA, 1989b, p. 61), and that his republican 
perspective is not liberal enough28. The new constitutionalism29 has rightly emphasized that legality 
as legitimacy is required because the lesson from the second world war is still there for everyone to 
learn from. To avoid the risk of the repetition of history, formal mechanisms must be put in place to 
guarantee “genuine public deliberation” (POSTEMA, 2019b, p. 246) and avoid the ever recurrent 
allure of the sirens of demagogy as well as the risk, for instance, of the (ab)use of emergency powers, 
covert data harvesting and mass surveillance30. 
 
3 CONCLUDING REMARKS: PRIVACY vs PUBLICITY 
 
In this paper many interpretations of Bentham’s contribution to jurisprudence have been 
reviewed. In particular, there has been a focus on Gerald Postema’s reading which puts particular 
emphasis on transparency, accountability and publicity, as distinct from the formal characteristics of 
the rule of law or legality (POSTEMA, 2020a). In this article his decades long contribution to 
 
27  See ANDRESANI; WARD, 2020; BENHABIB, 2011; RAWLS, 1971 [1999]. See also POSTEMA, 1982, 2008. 
28  POSTEMA, 2019b, ch 9. See also ZHAI, 2017. 
29  For the debate see e.g. HIRSCHL, 2007; STONE SWEET, 2000. For further details, see also ALEXY, 2015; 
FERRAJOLI, 2007; MORESO, 1997, 2002, 2009; POZZOLO, 2001; STAMILE, 2019. 
30  Which are increasingly becoming the hottest contemporary issues, e.g. Facebookgate after the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal, see also ANDRESANI; STAMILE, 2019. Postema’s critique (2019b, p. 246, see also POSTEMA, 1995a, 
1995b) might not be very distant from the alternative version of republicanism which has been proposed in our article 
just citated in this footnote. 
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Bentham’s scholarship has been a precious treasure for the proposed lines of further research 
development. 
In fact, fundamental rights such as privacy are not necessarily linked to an individualistic or 
indeed neoliberal worldview (BERNAL, 2014; TAYLOR; FLORIDI; VAN DER SLOOT, 2017) and 
privacy as well as all fundamental liberties can be justified from inside the republican tradition. The 
present reflections agree with Postema (2019b, ch.11) that open, transparent and accountable 
governance arrangements would not necessarily require trumping or a trade off with other 
(fundamental) rights such as privacy provided that the co-originality thesis is accepted31. 
The main claim of this article is in fact that the status of the right to privacy as well as all 
fundamental legal rights (FLRs) can be fully acknowledged by switching to a different, i.e. reflexive 
paradigm of law where the emphasis should be squarely put on the “reflexive” and “legitimate” 
application of procedures which would guarantee and protect the ongoing self-creation of 
constitutional rights. Such a conception of law is reflexive because the focus is on the formal 
application of procedures to procedures. It is also legitimate because citizens themselves would be 
required to participate in the deliberation about which rights to ascribe to themselves. Bentham’s 
longsighted vision is still built on the instrumental (Humean) conception of society in which a form 
of proto-democracy can be achieved by aggregating the preferences/desires of the greatest number of 
(a restricted group of: male, wealthy, etc.) citizens in the polity32. The reflexive conception relies 
instead on democratic deliberation taking the form of an ongoing process of constitution formation, 
with FLRs such as the right to privacy, as their stable but still changeable outcome. Such a system of 
rights, once constituted, would legitimize the unfolding of the deliberative democratic process. That 
is why the violation of such FLRs – including privacy – would undermine citizens’ capacity to 
participate effectively in democratic politics (see also ANDRESANI; STAMILE, 2019, 
forthcoming). 
There is empirical evidence of the pitfalls of relying on public and transparent but 
unreflexive and non-deliberative procedures: as Osrecki (2015, p. 337-364) has shown in relation to 
anti-corruption measures, policies violating privacy might actually have the unintended consequence 
of leading to sub-optimal outcomes as well as risking of being subject to arbitrary power due to lack 
of accountability and of the protection of fundamental liberties. To mention just another example, 
another value closely related to privacy, such as opacity, as discussed by Lucy (2017), who theorizes 
 
31  That is: the republican thesis that there is no deliberative democracy without legitimate legality, i.e. without protection 
of fundamental rights. See ANDRESANI; STAMILE, 2019; HABERMAS, 1996. 
32  For more details about the theoretical paradigm of Hume see POSTEMA, 1982, 2011; SPECTOR, 2014, p. 47-63. 
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it as the opposite of transparency, would be affected, with pernicious consequences not only for 
guaranteeing the rule of law as legitimacy but also other fundamental (legal) values such as dignity, 
equality and community as well as fairness. An interesting development of such an analysis, which 
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